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The Extrapolation Conundrum: Finding a Unified Theory for the Use of Statistical Sampling in 





Healthcare fraud has become one of the federal government’s costliest problems.  The 
government spends over one trillion dollars every year on Medicare and Medicaid.1  Total 
spending on healthcare in America is around 2.7 trillions dollars, roughly seventeen percent of 
the nation’s gross domestic product.2  Despite—or perhaps, because of—the massive amounts 
spent on healthcare, Medicare and Medicaid “have become a sitting duck for fraudulent 
activity.”3  In spite of constant attempts by both the FBI and the Department of Justice, Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud continue to cost the government—and thus taxpayers—billions of dollars.4  
Indeed, though estimates vary, fraud and systematic overcharging are estimated to cost the 
government roughly sixty billion dollars every year, totaling roughly ten percent of Medicare’s 
annual costs.5 
This widespread fraud stems in large part from the fact that the Medicare and Medicaid 
systems are, by their very nature, vulnerable to fraudulent activity conducted by dishonest 
practitioners.  Indeed, “the United States Government Accounting Office has labeled both the 
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1 The $272 Billion Swindle, THE ECONOMIST (May 31, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21603078-why-thieves-love-americas-health-care-system-272-billion-swindle. 
2 Id. 
3 Medicare: a System Ripe for Fraud, MEDICARE & MEDICAID FRAUD REPORTING CENTER, 
http://www.medicarefraudcenter.org/medicare-fraud-information/11-medicare-a-system-ripe-for-fraud.html (last 
visited Oct 30, 2015) (hereinafter “Medicare Fraud Reporting Center”). 
4 Merrill Matthews, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud is Costing Taxpayers Billions, FORBES (May 31, 2012, 3:08 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2012/05/31/medicare-and-medicaid-fraud-is-costing-taxpayers-
billions/. 
5 Reed Abelson & Eric Lichtblau, Pervasive Medicare Fraud Proves Hard to Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/business/uncovering-health-care-fraud-proves-elusive.html?_r=0. 
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Medicare and Medicaid programs ‘high-risk programs.’”6  Much of the problem stems from the 
fact that “the government pays [Medicare and Medicaid bills] on an honor system, requiring only 
electronic submission to claims for services or goods provided by a health care provider.7  The 
relative ease with which health care providers can file a claim was originally designed to provide 
quick and efficient payment to doctors who could then treat the poor and the needy; but, in more 
recent times, this lack of oversight has made it all too easy for dishonest health care providers to 
exploit the system.8  To make matters worse, “[no] built-in checks and balances or due diligence 
exists to protect the Medicare giant from the onslaught of [fraudulent activity].”9  The “[s]hear 
volume” of health care claims submitted each year under Medicare and Medicaid only adds to 
the problem, as the government faces the seemingly unfeasible task of sorting out proper claims 
from fraudulent ones in a pool of millions of claims submitted by millions of Americans.10 
With executive, administrative, and institutional efforts failing to prevent widespread health 
care fraud, the government has come to rely more and more on an old, though still very useful 
tool: the False Claims Act.11  For many years, the federal government has considered the False 
Claims Act (FCA) to be its primary instrument in preventing fraud against the government.12 
Today, private actions brought under the FCA play a “vital role” in fighting Medicare fraud.13  In 
                                                        
6 Health Care Fraud and False Claims, PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP, 
http://www.falseclaimsact.com/common-types-of-fraud/health-care-fraud (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
7 See Medicare Fraud Reporting Center, supra note 3. 
8 See Medicare Fraud Reporting Center, supra note 3. 
9 See Medicare Fraud Reporting Center, supra note 3. 
10 See Pietragallo, supra note 6. 
11 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
12 See S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1986). 
13 See Medicare Fraud Reporting Center, supra note 3. 
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2014 alone, the Department of Justice recovered over two billion dollars in health care-related 
FCA actions.14 
The FCA is not without its drawbacks, however.  Health care fraud cases brought under the 
FCA are often large, unwieldy affairs involving thousands of claims.15   Faced with the practical 
impossibility of sorting through such a large volume of claims, the government and private 
relators have turned to statistical sampling—sometimes called “extrapolation”—as an efficient 
way to determine the characteristics of large sets of data.16  Statistical sampling is an 
economically efficient and scientifically accepted mathematical method for drawing inferences 
and generalizations about a large set of data based on a subset data.17  Furthermore, it has long 
been established that statistical sampling is a viable method for proving damages in FCA cases, 
and most courts have allowed its use for this limited purpose.18 
In recent years, the government has begun a push towards using statistical sampling not only 
for proving damages, but for proving liability as well.19  Courts have split on the issue; some 
have allowed statistical sampling for proving liability, some have allowed it only for proving 
damages, and still others have not allowed it at all.20  Yet there remains no unified theory for 
                                                        
14 Press Release, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014. 
15 Jeanne A. Markey & Raymond M. Sarola, 4th Cicr. FCA Statistical Sampling Case is One to Watch, LAW360 
(Oct. 8, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/712001/4th-circ-fca-statistical-sampling-case-is-one-to-
watch. 
16 See id. 
17 See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 969 
(2007) (providing the history and scientific background of statistical sampling). 
18 See United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (D.P.R. 2000) (establishing that statistical sampling 
is generally permitted for establishing damages and providing an overview of cases that have permitted it). 
19 Matthew D. Benedetto, Statistical Sampling on the Rise in False Claims Act Cases, LOS ANGELES DAILY 
JOURNAL (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/statistical-sampling-
on-the-rise-in-false-claims-act-cases.pdf. 
20  For concise arguments on both sides of the issue, compare United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., 
Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (prohibiting statistical sampling), with 
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., No. 1:08-cv-251, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660 (E.D. Tenn. 
Sep. 29, 2014) (allowing statistical sampling). 
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when and how statistical sampling should be implemented.  The courts that have addressed the 
issue have held for one approach or the other without espousing a guiding framework that can be 
applied on a case-by-case basis.  Furthermore, courts addressing the use of statistical sampling 
have taken ostensibly extreme approaches, allowing either an uninhibited use of statistical 
sampling or, alternatively, a restricted approach that prohibits the use of statistical sampling in 
almost every instance. 
This comment will argue for a middle ground between these extreme approaches while 
developing a single, unified framework for determining whether statistical sampling should be 
permitted in a given case.  Part II will provide a more detailed overview of the history and 
development of the FCA and the use of statistical sampling.  Part III will provide an analysis of 
the reasons courts have provided for allowing the use of statistical sampling, while Part IV will 
analyze the reasons courts have given for prohibiting the use of statistical sampling.  Finally, Part 
V will put forth a unified framework for the use of statistical sampling in FCA cases, while also 
explaining the framework’s origins and various rationales.   
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that this note only addresses the issue of when 
statistical sampling should be used for proving liability because it is well settled, with perhaps a 
few outliers, that statistical sampling is generally agreed to be permissible for calculating 
damages.21  Furthermore, this comment will address only the use of statistical sampling in health 
care fraud cases brought in federal court under the FCA, and will not address statistical sampling 
in other contexts, such as mass tort cases, or the use of statistical sampling in administrative 
rulings.22   
                                                        
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
22 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am. at *36 (“Appeals from administrative agency decisions are 
distinguishable from [cases brought under the FCA] because they are considered by an appellate court under a 
different standard of review.”). 
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In attempting to create a unified framework for statistical sampling, this comment will 
endeavor to reconcile the various cautions, concerns, and principles that have led courts to come 
out on different sides of the issue.  This unified framework will provide for a cautionary 
approach to the use of statistical sampling for proving liability in FCA cases.  In particular, it 
will require the party proposing to use statistical sampling to show some legitimate reason for 
why the use of statistical sampling will be necessary.  The effect will be to create what is in 
essence a rebuttable presumption23 against the use of statistical sampling for proving liability, 
which can be overcome by a showing of hardship on the party proposing to use statistical 
sampling, or where claim-by-claim review is a practicable impossibility. The ultimate result of 
this approach will be a legal framework that allows the government and private relators to have 
access to statistical sampling in cases where it is necessary to prevent large-scale fraud, while 
also preventing its use in smaller cases where the benefits are slight and there is a large potential 
for abuse. 
II. A Brief History of the FCA and Statistical Sampling 
 A. The Humble Origins and Modern Power of the False Claims Act 
 The FCA imposes liability on any person who knowingly presents the United States with 
a false or fraudulent claim for payment.24  Under the FCA, private individuals, legally known as 
“relators,” are permitted to bring suits in the government’s name, known as qui tam suits, for 
fraudulent conduct committed against the United States.25  The False Claims Act was originally 
implemented during the Civil War as a way for the federal government to control fraud on the 
                                                        
23 The term “rebuttable presumption” in this sense means a presumption against the legitimacy of statistical 
sampling in a given case that can be overcome by a showing of additional facts that warrant its use. See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (6th ed. 1990). 
24 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
25 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
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part of defense contractors.26  But as the federal government’s involvement in the national 
economy continued to grow throughout the Twentieth Century, and as pervasive fraud became 
ever more present, the once innocuous False Claims Act began to take a more central role in the 
government’s attempts to prevent fraud.27  In the 1980s, against a backdrop of national efforts to 
encourage whistleblowing against health care fraud,28 the FCA took on its current form.29  As 
currently constructed, the FCA imposes severe penalties on violators, including a provision for 
treble damages and fines of up to ten thousand dollars per claim.30  Private relators, for their part, 
receive substantial rewards ranging from between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the proceeds 
of the action or settlement of the claim.31  Together, this system of penalties and rewards, which 
came to full fruition through the enactment of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, lay at the heart 
of an increasingly aggressive government scheme to root out fraudulent activity.32 
 The aggressive enforcement scheme prompted by the 1986 amendments to the FCA has 
fallen heavily—perhaps even disproportionately—in the field of health care.33  Indeed, the 
modern FCA has become a “nightmare for the health care industry,” as “[h]ealth care providers 
have discovered that billing errors once viewed as mistakes in need of correction, are now 
attacked as crimes that compel million dollar settlements.”34  The focus on health care fraud has 
also come in conjunction with a massive rise in litigation brought under the FCA since the 
                                                        
26  See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves Into a Modern 
Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1998). 
27 See id. at 459–61.  
28 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for 
Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 275–83 (1992). 
29  See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 461. 
30 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). 
31 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1) (2012). 
32 See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 460. 
33 See Frank LaSalle, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for 
Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 502 (1995). 
34 See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 456. 
 7 
enactment of the 1986 amendments.35  As an example, there were twelve qui tam cases brought 
under the FCA in 1987, compared to two hundred and twenty brought in 1994.36  Over seven 
hundred qui tam actions have been brought under the FCA in every year since 2010.37 
With health care fraud now standing front and center in cases brought under the FCA, 
and with litigation on the rise, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the government is willing 
to push the boundaries of permissible methods of proving liability.  Statistical sampling now 
stands at the forefront of one of the largest and most important areas of federal litigation, and its 
fate as a tool for proving liability will have a massive effect in shaping the future of health care 
fraud litigation.38 
B. The History and Development of Statistical Sampling 
 Statistical sampling is not a new evidentiary method.  On the contrary, and perhaps 
surprisingly, it has been used in litigation since as early as the 1920s.39  And while statistical 
sampling has been used—if not always accepted—in litigation for nearly a century, it has been 
recognized as a legitimate mathematical methodology in the world of science for even longer.40  
Statistical sampling was first permitted in a trademark case in 1940, and it had “gained full 
acceptance in trademark law” by 1963.41  By 1990, statistical sampling had made its way into 
mass tort cases.42  Today, courts and legal scholars generally recognize statistical sampling as a 
                                                        
35 See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 456; LaSalle, supra note 33, at 501–02.  
36 LaSalle, supra note 33, at 501. 
37 2014 Year-End False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-Update.aspx. 
38 See Benedetto, supra note 19. 
39 See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376 (D. Del. 1928) (disallowing the use of statistical 
sampling in a trademark dispute). 
40 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 974 (“Sampling came to law later than to science.”). 
41 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 975. 
42 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 976. 
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viable evidentiary method, and statistical reasoning and analysis is routinely used in "antitrust, 
employment discrimination, toxic torts, and voting rights cases.”43   
 In general, statistical sampling is a methodology whereby a small sample of data is used 
to determine the characteristics of a much larger set of data.44  While the specific process 
sometimes differs based on a variety of complex factors, statisticians tend to adhere to several 
basic principles in order to minimize bias and ensure the highest degree of accuracy possible.45 
To put the matter succinctly, “a good survey defines an appropriate population, uses a probability 
method for selecting the sample, has a high response rate, and gathers accurate information on 
the sample units.  When these goals are met, the sample tends to be representative of the 
population.  Data from the sample can be extrapolated.”46   
 To be sure, statistical sampling is not a matter of simple number crunching.  In fact, 
parties seeking to use statistical sampling in a particular case, even if just as a calculation of 
damages, will usually require the use of a statistician as an expert witness for purposes of 
developing the appropriate statistical method for the given facts and making the appropriate 
calculations for extrapolating the sample to the entire universe of claims.47  In health care fraud 
cases in particular, statistical sampling often involves complicated methods for determining “the 
population of interest” from among thousands of claims, while also “identify[ing] a data source 
from which the sample will be drawn” to fit into a “sampling frame” which “comprehensively 
                                                        
43 David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 211, 213 (3d ed. 2011). 
44 See, e.g., id. (explaining the methodology and process behind the use of statistics in litigation); Walker & 
Monahan, supra note 17 (providing a history and general background on statistical sampling). 
45 See generally Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43 (providing an in-depth explanation of statistical sampling 
methodology). 
46 Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 226. 
47 See, e.g., United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379; United States 
ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660.  
 9 
reflect[s] the population.”48  With such complex calculations, and with so many variables in play, 
statistical sampling inevitably involves at least some margin for error.49 
 It must be made clear that, while statistical sampling is a generally accepted evidentiary 
method, there is a large difference between the way in which statistical sampling has 
traditionally been used and the proposal for using statistical sampling as a means of proving 
liability in health care fraud cases brought under the FCA.  Historically, statistical sampling has 
been used as a method either for determining damages or for demonstrating the external 
characteristics or beliefs of a population subset.50  For instance, in trademark cases, where 
statistical sampling first made its mark on the law, it was used primarily in regards to surveys as 
a means of demonstrating market confusion.51  In the context of mass torts, it has typically been 
used as a way to calculate damages and streamline large class-action cases involving similarly 
situated plaintiffs.52  But, “[w]hile it’s [sic] been widely used in complex civil litigation, 
statistical sampling has been rarely used in federal False Claims Act litigation.”53  As an 
additional matter, statistical sampling, where it has been used in FCA cases, has been used 
traditionally for determining damages and not for proving liability.54  
 The application of statistical sampling for proving liability in FCA cases would thus be a 
fairly large step in the evolution of the use of statistical sampling in litigation.  In essence, using 
statistical sampling to prove liability in a health care fraud case brought under the FCA would 
                                                        
48 United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, No. 8:11-cv-1303-T-23TBM, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
55384, at *7–8  (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2015). 
49 Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 243–46. 
50 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 974–77. 
51 See, e.g., Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 376–78 (plaintiff attempted to use expert witness 
testimony to show that their was market confusion concerning the name “Elgin” based on a survey of two thousand 
consumers); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (random sample of five 
hundred people showed market confusion in relation to Zippo brand lighters). 
52 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 976–77. 
53 See Benedetto, supra note 19. 
54 See Benedetto, supra note 19. 
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involve taking a small sample of the total number of claims brought against the defendants, 
determining liability in the small sample of claims, and then, through the use of an expert witness 
statistician, extrapolating liability to the total universe of claims.55  This methodology, which 
involves proving liability through what is essentially a mathematical formula—and without any 
individual, claim-by-claim review—would be an extraordinary step in FCA litigation.  It thus 
warrants a cautionary approach. 
III. Critique and Analysis of the Reasons Courts Have Given for Allowing Statistical Sampling 
Courts that have allowed the use of statistical sampling have typically done so on the 
principle that statistical sampling and extrapolation are viable and accurate scientific methods 
with a long tradition of use in complex litigation.  Other courts go further, reasoning that 
statistical sampling is the only viable way of determining liability and ensuring proper recovery 
in large-scale qui tam actions.  These courts tend to see no reason why the basic methodology 
cannot be extended to proving liability, especially in cases involving a large number of claims.  It 
is somewhat striking, however, that several of the courts that have allowed statistical sampling 
have endorsed an almost uninhibited use of statistical sampling, implying that the government 
and private relators should be free to use it whenever possible as a means of proving liability.  
This perhaps goes too far, as there are various drawbacks to its use. 
A. Statistical Sampling as a Practical Necessity 
The primary argument for allowing statistical sampling as a means of proving liability is 
that it is simply a necessary way of allowing the government and private relators to efficiently 
prove liability.  This reasoning was put forward succinctly in United States ex rel. Martin v. Life 
Care Centers of America: “[g]iven the large number of claims that can be submitted by a single 
                                                        
55 See, e.g., United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379 (explaining the 
basic methodology); United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660 (same). 
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entity to be reimbursed by Medicare, it is often not practicable to do a claim-by-claim review 
of each allegedly false claim in a complex FCA action.”56  Furthermore, “[t]he purpose of the 
FCA as well as the development and expansion of government programs as to which it may be 
employed support the use of statistical sampling in complex FCA actions where a claim-by-
claim review is impracticable.”57  This sentiment was echoed in United States ex rel. Ruckh v. 
Genoa Healthcare, LLC, in which the court stated that it would allow the use of statistical 
sampling because, “[c]onsidering the large universe of allegedly false claims in the instant case, 
it would be impracticable for the Court to review each claim individually.58  Economic 
considerations also played a part in this determination, as the court in Martin stated: “if the Court 
were to individually review each allegedly false claim or statement in this action, it would 
consume an unacceptable portion of the Court's limited resources.”59 
This may well be true of large cases, where there are thousands of claims under review. 
In Martin, for instance, the defendant health care provider owned and operated more than two-
hundred nursing home facilities throughout the United States, and there were over one hundred 
thousand claims of fraud at issue.60  Likewise, in Ruckh, the claims against the defendant 
involved charges of fraudulent overbilling for patients at each of its fifty-three medical facilities 
throughout the state of Florida.61  Indeed, both Martin and Ruckh distinguished an earlier case 
that had prohibited the use of statistical sampling, United States v. Friedman, on the grounds that 
                                                        
56 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *61–62.  
57 Id. at *61. 
58 United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55384, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 
2015). 
59 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *46. 
60 Id. at *6, 20. 
61 United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55384, at *2–3. 
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it involved a substantially smaller number of claims.62  By contrast with Martin and Ruckh, 
where thousands of claims were at issue, Friedman only contained 676 total claims.63   
But distinguishing Friedman only begs the question of how many claims are enough to 
warrant statistical sampling.64  There is no guiding principle to establish the point at which 
claim-by-claim review becomes unfeasible, and drawing a line at a particular number seems an 
unsatisfactorily arbitrary alternative.  To be sure, 676 total claims is not a small number, and the 
Friedman court gave no indication that its decision to not allow sampling was based in any way 
on the total number of claims.65  Adding to the problem is the fact that the number of claims may 
not tell the whole story.  Depending on the facts and difficulty of the case, it may be more or less 
feasible to perform a claim-by-claim review.  Theoretically, two separate cases could have the 
same number of claims and, yet, based on their facts, may be differently situated in regards to the 
feasibility of claim-by-claim review.  Unfortunately, while both cases may in fact have been 
correctly decided, neither Martin nor Ruckh provides an answer to the question of how many 
claims are enough to warrant statistical sampling. 
B. Statistical Sampling as a Viable and Accurate Scientific Methodology 
Courts that have allowed statistical sampling also tend to focus on statistical sampling’s 
reputation as an accurate and legitimate scientific method.  In United States ex rel. Loughren v. 
UnumProvident Corp., for instance, the court, in allowing statistical sampling, noted its belief 
that “extrapolation is a reasonable method for determining the number of false claims so long as 
                                                        
62 See id. at *9–10 (citing Martin for the proposition that Friedman is distinguishable due to the smaller number of 
claims); Martin, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *45 (“Friedman is distinct from the instant case because there was 
a sufficiently limited universe of claims for the court to review each one individually rather than relying on 
extrapolation.”). 
63 United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n. 1 (D. Mass. July 23, 1993). 
64 The court in Martin distinguished Friedman due to its smaller number of claims, but put forward no principle to 
determine at what point the number of claims becomes too large for claim-by-claim review. 
65 See Friedman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n. 1.  There is nothing in the Friedman opinion’s analysis to 
suggest its holding was based on a sufficiently limited number of claims. 
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the statistical methodology is appropriate.”66  The court in Martin adopted a similar confidence 
in statistical sampling, noting that “courts now consider ‘mathematical and statistical methods [to 
be] well recognized as reliable and acceptable evidence in determining adjudicative facts.’”67  
And while the Martin court recognized that "using extrapolation to establish damages when 
liability has been proven is different than using extrapolation to establish liability,” it 
nevertheless found no reason not to make the leap towards applying statistical sampling to a 
finding of liability.68  Indeed, “the court’s opinion did not significantly engage with the 
damages/liability divide.”69  It thus appears, at least in the view of courts adopting statistical 
sampling as a means of proving liability, that the same scientific legitimacy that allows for 
statistical sampling to be used in calculating damages is equally applicable for using it as a 
means of proving liability.70 
But whether this is actually true is a closer call than the court opinions in Martin, Ruckh, 
and Loughren lead on.  Statistics are, after all, an imperfect method, especially when used to 
prove a point.71  Statistics are also prone to manipulation.72  As statistician Richard Traflinger 
put it:  
You can find statistics that show cigarettes are killers and that they have 
no effect on anyone's health. You can find statistics that say you should cut down 
on the consumption of dairy products and that dairy products are good for you. 
You can find statistics that prove that soft drinks will give you cancer and that 
                                                        
66 United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261 (D. Mass 2009). 
67 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *29–30 (quoting State of 
Ga., Dep't of Human Res. v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 409 (N.D. Ga. 1977)). 
68 Id. at *39. 
69 Recent Case: False Claims Act – Proof of Liability – Eastern District of Tennessee Rules that Statistical 
Extrapolation may Suffice to Prove Liability, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2080 (2015). 
70 It is perhaps somewhat surprising that many of the courts addressing the statistical sampling question do not 
explicitly address the difference between using sampling for a damages calculation and using it to prove liability.  
For courts that have accepted statistical sampling for proving liability, it appears implicit in their reasoning that 
scientific legitimacy is a major part of the reason why they have accepted it. 
71 Richard Traflinger, The Problems With Statistics, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY 
http://public.wsu.edu/~taflinge/evistats.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
72 Id. 
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they have no effect on anything but your thirst (or even that they make you 
thirstier). Every one of these sets of statistics is absolutely true.73 
 
This is not to suggest that statistics are never trustworthy or reliable.  On the contrary, as many 
courts have pointed out, statistical modeling enjoys a great deal of legitimacy and prestige as a 
reliable scientific tool in the realms of both academia and the law.74  Traflinger’s point, however, 
is that statistics can be fairly arcane and surprisingly complex, and laypersons can be misled by 
what they believe is a fairly straightforward statistical model.  This is especially important with 
regard to FCA litigation, where expert witnesses hired by the parties will perform the statistical 
modeling.  If statistics can be slanted in any variety of ways to prove the point that their 
proponent is attempting to establish, then their use in proving liability warrants caution and 
consideration.  
Statistics may also be suspect because they “do not tell the whole story,” especially 
concerning the relevance and validity of statistical comparisons.75  These observations are 
especially relevant in the context of of statistical sampling, which necessarily involves 
comparisons between different types of claims.  Essentially, evidence of liability for one claim 
does not necessarily mean evidence of liability for another claim, especially where the two 
claims are factually distinct.  Indeed, statistics are especially suspect where evidence of a certain 
outcome in one situation is taken to mean evidence of the same outcome in a different 
situation,76 which is the exact methodology that would be used to prove liability in FCA cases. 
Furthermore, health care fraud cases pose their own unique problems with regard to the 
use of statistical sampling in the sense that it is very difficult for statisticians to create “truly 
                                                        
73 Id. 
74 See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, 28–31. 
75 Traflinger, supra note 71. 
76 Traflinger, supra note 71. 
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representative” and homogenous samples.77  For example, in regards to homogeneity of the 
sample, it may be difficult for the statistician to differentiate, at least in cases where the 
defendant health care provider controls multiple health care organizations, between “different 
state Medicaid programs that have different qualifying requirements [for purposes of Medicare 
and Medicaid billing],” as well as differences between “rural and suburban, as well as specialty, 
hospitals in [the] sample.”78  Simply put, it is difficult to extrapolate claims from a small sample 
when that sample is tenuously related to the larger universe of claims, such as where differences 
between hospitals, state laws, and billing requirements necessarily create differences that are 
exceptionally difficult to quantify in a statistical methodology.79  In this sense, complexity cuts 
both ways; claim-by-claim review may well be unfeasible in large and complex FCA health care 
fraud cases, but it is this same complexity that cautions against the free and uninhibited use of 
statistical sampling. 
This is not to say that statistical sampling should never be permissible.  No evidentiary 
method is perfect, and it may well be said that it is up to the adversarial process, rather than trial 
courts, to find flaws in the propagated statistical sampling method.80  Still, the problems inherent 
in the use of statistics warrant, at perhaps the very least, a restrained approach.  This is especially 
true in smaller cases with a manageable number of claims, where the problems associated with 
statistical sampling may outweigh the benefits. 
 
                                                        
77 Kirby D. Behre & Jeff Ifrah, Statisticians at DOJ may Overstate Case; Government’s Use of Statistical Sampling 
to Prove False Claims Act Liability, Damages may be Unreliable, if not Impermissible, 21 NAT’L LAW JOURNAL 22 
(1999). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *31 (“The opposing 
party can challenge the sample through cross-examination of the proponent’s expert, presentation of its own expert, 
as well as other competing witnesses and evidence.”). 
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IV. Reasons for Limiting the Use of Statistical Sampling 
Courts have given a number of justifications for denying the use of statistical sampling, 
including concerns that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof, the fact-specific nature of 
many FCA cases, the fact that statistical sampling is not a form of concrete evidence, and the 
requirement that plaintiffs must prove each individual claim on its own merits.81  The idea has 
also been put forward, by legal scholarship more than case law, that using statistical sampling to 
prove liability violates Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that 
fraud be pleaded with particularity.82  Finally, at the fringes of the argument is the concept that 
using statistical sampling to prove liability violates the defendant’s due process rights.83 
A. How the Fact-Specific Nature of Health Care Fraud Cases Warrants Against Statistical  
     Sampling 
 
Many of the arguments espoused for prohibiting the use of statistical sampling stem from 
a little-known, unpublished, and seemingly innocuous case out of the District of Massachusetts, 
United States v. Friedman, in which the court declined the government’s request to extrapolate 
from a random sample of 350 out of a total of 676 claims prepared and analyzed by an expert 
witness.84  The court based this decision on the “existence at trial of discrete claims which were 
analyzed and discussed and subjected to cross examination” and which thus necessitated a claim-
by-claim review.85  The trial judge added that, “[w]hile [he was] mindful of the government's 
                                                        
81 For the most concise arguments against the use of statistical sampling, see, e.g., United States ex rel Michaels v. 
Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379; United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 
533 F. Supp. 2d 12, 31 n. 9 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. Friedman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496. 
82 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
83 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77 (“Due process arguments alone appear to be insufficient to preclude government 
use of random sampling.”); United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at 
*59–60 (rejecting defendant’s due process claim). 
84 United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n. 1. 
85 See id. 
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efforts to shorten the trial and present its evidence efficiently and clearly, [he was] reluctant to 
accept a statistical sampling as the basis for doubling the alleged overpayment without the same 
scrutiny and support [as that provided by claim-by-claim review].”86  Sampling was not, 
however, one of the case’s main issues, and it was deemed by the trial judge as trivial enough to 
be relegated to a footnote.87 
This has not stopped courts from relying on Friedman’s reasoning.  In United States ex 
rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Community, Inc.,88 a case currently on interlocutory appeal,89 the 
court “agree[d] with the analysis provided by the District Court in Friedman” and denied the 
plaintiffs’ request to use statistical sampling for proving liability.90  In applying the principles of 
Friedman to the facts of its own case, the court in Michaels noted that “the patients’ medical 
charts are all intact and available for review by either party,” and thus a claim-by-claim 
examination of each patient’s medical charts was necessary for determining liability.91  In a 
broader sense, the court’s holding seems to imply that extrapolation is not warranted in highly 
fact-sensitive cases where each claim is distinct, unique, and warrants individual examination.92 
Two other cases, United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington University and 
United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., also espouse these principles. 
In El-Amin, the defendant health care organization was accused of overbilling for anesthesia 
services.93  The relators alleged that the defendants had defrauded Medicare by falsely 
                                                        
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379. 
89 See Jeff Overley, 4th Circ. Takes Up Milestone FCA Sampling Case, Law360 (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/709102/4th-circ-takes-up-milestone-fca-sampling-case. 
90 Michaels, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379, at *20. 
91 Id. at *19–20. 
92 Id. at *5 (“Each and every claim at issue in this case is fact-dependent and wholly unrelated to each and every 
other claim.”). 
93 United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 533 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18–20 (2008). 
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representing that certain anesthesia procedures had been wholly performed by a licensed 
anesthesiologist, “when in fact portions of the procedure had been performed by residents or 
[nurse anesthetists].”94  Each claim thus necessarily turned on what type of procedure was being 
performed and who was performing it.95  In denying the use of statistical sampling, the court 
alluded to the fact-specific nature of the case, stating that “[f]or each claim, the Relators will be 
expected to provide, at a minimum, the date the claim was filed with Medicare, the name of the 
attending anesthesiologist, the type of medical procedure involved, and the amount of the 
claim.”96  Similarly, the court in Hockett—a case concerning fraudulent activity related to the 
length of patient stays—declined to allow statistical sampling due in part to the highly fact-
sensitive nature of the case.97  In particular, the court noted that in each particular claim, there 
could be “many other, completely innocuous alternative explanations for the increased length of 
patient stays – such as the patients just getting sicker.”98  Thus, with the facts for each claim in 
doubt, the court opted for a traditional claim-by-claim review, as opposed to statistical sampling. 
As demonstrated in Michaels, El-Amin, and Hockett, statistical sampling is perhaps a 
poor tool in cases where there are large numbers of separate and distinct claims.  The courts in 
these cases seemed in agreement that the presence of discrete and factually sensitive claims 
warranted a claim-by-claim analysis of the relevant evidence.  To submit such fact-intensive 
inquires to a broad and sweeping extrapolation test is simply counterintuitive, and the principle 
behind statistical extrapolation—that a small sample can be necessarily representative of a larger 
                                                        
94 Id. at 19. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 31 n. 9. 
97 See United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 65–66  (D.D.C. 2007). 
98 Id. at 66. 
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sample—loses much of its steam when applied to a situation where each item within the sample 
is distinctive from every other.99 
B. The Need for Concrete Evidence in FCA Cases 
Closely related to the issue of fact-specificity is the necessity, at least in the belief of 
some courts, for the government and private relators to prove FCA claims with specific and 
concrete evidence.100  In Hockett, for instance, the court held that “welding inferences together 
[through statistical sampling] cannot substitute for direct proof.”101  Moreover, the court stated 
that it was “imperative for [the] relator to produce real evidence to support her contention that 
patients were actually held longer than necessary” as part of the defendant’s scheme to defraud 
the government.”102  Though the court was cognizant of the fact that “where some degree of 
liability is conceded, slight deviations from traditional modes of proof are tolerable,”103 it 
nevertheless held firm in its holding that statistical sampling could not by itself form a basis for 
liability in the absence of direct proof and concrete evidence.104 
These principles were further expounded in United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS 
Healthcare of Illinois., Inc.  In Crews, the Plaintiff-relators brought suit against a pharmaceutical 
company for the illegal recycling and repurposing of prescription drugs.105  The statistical 
sampling methodology used in the case was based on the plaintiff’s assertion that “all claims for 
                                                        
99 Statistical sampling works best where the sample is truly representative of the whole and where there is a great 
degree of homogeneity.  Highly discrete and fact -sensitive claims necessarily obfuscate the certainty with which the 
statistical model can be said to be homogenous and representative of the whole.  See supra notes 77–79 and 
accompanying text. 
100 The issues of fact-specificity and the need for concrete evidence converge, and at times conflate, at many points. 
This is due to the fact that highly fact-specific claims necessarily entail a great deal of evidence.  As a result, many 
courts dealing with a highly fact-specific set of claims often raise the additional issue of the need for concrete 
evidence in proving each specific claim. 
101 United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 65–66. 
102 Id. at 66. 
103 Id. at 67. 
104 Id. at 65–67. 
105 United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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recycled and redispensed [sic] and medications are false claims” as a matter of law.106  Working 
off of this assumption, the plaintiffs then calculated the number of false claims based on the 
percentage of patients on Medicaid and the percentage of dispensed medications returned 
unused.107  The plaintiffs then argued that the result of this calculation conclusively “prove[d] 
that 6% to 12% of recycled drugs would have been [re]distributed to Medicaid recipients” had it 
not been for the defendant’s fraudulent activity, and that the defendant was this liable to this 
extent.108  In upholding the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff could not simply rely on a bare calculation to prove liability, but 
rather had the burden of establishing liability with proof of actual false claims.109 
C. The Strange Case of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
The need for concrete proof to prove liability in FCA cases may also have a statutory 
basis in the from of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which states in pertinent part:  “In 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake.110  Thus, “under Rule 9(b), mere conclusory allegations of falsity are 
insufficient; rather, the plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and 
why it is false.”111  This would apply to statistical sampling in the sense that each claim must be 
proven on its own terms, and liability cannot be proven for a particular claim simply through 
extrapolation based on a statistical model.  The Department of Justice originally took the position 
                                                        
106 Id. at 856. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id; see also United States ex rel. Trim v. McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (W.D. Okla. 1998) (declining to 
allow a pure percentage calculation to prove liability). 
110 Fed R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
111 Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
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that Rule 9(b) did not apply the cases brought under the FCA.112  A string of court rulings in the 
late 1990s, however, made clear that Rule 9(b) did in fact apply to FCA cases.113 
At least one court has endorsed the view that Rule 9(b) prohibits the use of statistical 
sampling to prove liability.  In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., the plaintiff-relator alleged that the defendant physician had violated the FCA by 
submitting claims for unnecessary services.114  In support of these allegations, the plaintiff put 
forward as evidence a statistical calculation showing that “in reasonable probability … 
approximately 40 percent of claims submitted by defendants for services rendered … were for 
services that were not medically necessary.”115  In affirming a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s 
claims, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) because he “provided no factual basis for his belief that defendants 
submitted claims for medically unnecessary services other than his reference to statistical 
studies.116  The plaintiff’s “allegations, therefore, amount[ed] to nothing more than 
speculation.”117 
Though seemingly a perfect case for courts looking to add precedential support to a 
holding that statistical sampling cannot be used to prove liability, neither Thompson, nor its 
approach to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), has remained relevant in the debate over 
statistical sampling.118  Indeed, despite its seeming relevancy, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b) has faded entirely from both the case law and scholarship on the issue of statistical 
                                                        
112 Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
113 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
114 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 1997). 
115 Id. at 903. 
116 Id. 
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118 Thompson, despite being a relatively older case, is not cited, either positively or negatively, in any other case 
appearing in this comment. 
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sampling.119  It is thus fair to say at this point in the debate that whether a court is willing to 
allow statistical sampling will depend almost entirely on its own judgment of the need for 
concrete evidence for proving specific claims. 
D. Possible Shortcomings in Cases that Have Disallowed Statistical Sampling 
Much like the cases that have allowed statistical sampling, the cases that have disallowed 
the use of statistical sampling have not provided a clear and workable framework for when 
statistical should be permitted and when it should not.  Also, many, if not all, of the courts that 
have prohibited statistical sampling for proving liability have largely ignored or dismissed out-
of-hand many of the strongest arguments espousing its permissibility, such as the fact that claim-
by-claim review may be impossible where there is a large universe of claims.120  Nor have these 
courts addressed the idea that statistical sampling may be warranted in a case where the claims 
are not highly fact-specific, and thus evidence of guilt in one claim necessarily implies evidence 
of guilt in the entire universe of claims.121  These courts have thus warned of the dangers of 
statistical sampling—dangers which may well be relevant to the facts of the case at hand—
without contemplating that there may be fact patterns where these dangers are extremely limited 
or totally non-existent.  And simply because statistical sampling is not warranted, or is somehow 
dubious, as applied to a particular case, does not necessarily mean that it is never warranted in 
any case. 
V. A Unified Framework for Statistical Sampling 
                                                        
119 Thompson is the only case appearing in this comment that interprets Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) as 
having any effect on the use of statistical sampling in FCA cases. 
120 But see United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379, at *18 (inferring 
that statistical sampling may be permissible where evidence has been destroyed). 
121 This is perhaps due in part to the fact that the courts that have disallowed the use of statistical sampling have not 
confronted a case in which the universe of claims was sufficiently homogenous. 
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That courts have come out differently on the matter of statistical sampling does not 
necessarily mean that one side or the other is deciding the cases incorrectly.  On the contrary, the 
different outcomes may be explained by fundamentally different sets of facts, where the 
problems of one approach are clearly evident and the problems of the other approach are 
minimal.  The problem, it may be said, is not so much one of legal and interpretational conflict 
as much as it is the lack of a unifying principle for determining when statistical sampling can be 
used and when it cannot.  This may be due to the fact that most of the courts that have decided 
issues related to statistical sampling are District Courts, and there is thus less of an impetus in 
creating law—and thus a unified framework—than there is in simply deciding the case correctly 
on its facts.  And this lack of a unified principle may of course change after the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals makes a ruling on the Michaels appeal.122 
The ensuing framework that forms the basis for this portion of the comment will be an 
attempt to consolidate the various competing factors on both sides of the statistical sampling 
debate.  Ultimately, it will call for a restrained approach to the use of statistical sampling, placing 
the burden on the plaintiff to show why the use of statistical sampling is warranted.  In meeting 
this burden, the plaintiff will have to show some form of undue hardship that necessitates the use 
of statistical sampling.  Finally, in determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the 
court should look to three categories: (1) the number of claims; (2) whether the level of fact-
specificity and the discreteness of the individual claims is such that claim-by-claim review is 
necessary; and (3) other factors that may bear on the total outcome of the case, such as bad faith 
or consent of the parties.  The effect of this framework, at least in a theoretical sense, will be to 
allow statistical sampling where it is necessary as the only viable way to ensure recovery, while 
                                                        
122See Overley, supra note 89. 
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denying the use of statistical sampling in cases where claim-by-claim review is feasible and 
necessary. 
A. The Need for a Cautious Approach to Statistical Sampling 
It would not be unfair to ask why the plaintiff should have the burden of demonstrating 
that statistical sampling should be used in a given case.  Indeed, it has been argued that there is 
nothing wrong with using a “straightforward application of a long-standing and highly efficient 
[methodology] …. to efficiently and accurately provide evidence as to liability.123  The answer 
lies in the fact that proving liability is a fundamentally different matter from proving damages.  It 
is one thing to allow a statistical model for a damages calculation where liability has already 
been proven; it is quite another to allow a statistical model as the only means of proving liability, 
and without any claim-by-claim examination.  Proving liability implicates concerns, problems, 
and procedural requirements that simply do not factor into a damages analysis.124  This is 
especially true given the “quasi-criminal” nature of the FCA.125  Indeed, the argument could be 
made “that such extrapolation would unfairly, or at least prematurely, shift the burden to the 
[defendant].”126  Simply put, statistical sampling’s speed and efficiency is not worth its 
procedural infirmities in cases where claim-by-claim review is otherwise available.  It is 
therefore necessary for the plaintiff to show something more—some form of hardship—before 
statistical sampling is warranted. 
Courts endorsing the use of statistical sampling have tried to argue around the issue of 
burden shifting.  In Martin for instance, the court argued that no burden shifting had taken place 
because the defendant still had  “the opportunity to depose the Government's expert, challenge 
                                                        
123 Markey & Sarola, supra note 15. 
124 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
125 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
126 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77. 
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the qualifications of the Government's expert, retain its own expert, and to present all of this 
evidence at trial.”127  The court further solidified its approach to the subject by noting that the 
jury would provide a necessary check on the potential abuses of statistical sampling.128  But this 
perhaps misses the point.  If statistical sampling is not necessary, or even unwarranted in a 
particular case, there is simply no valid reason to complicate the matter and risk confusing the 
jury solely in the name of efficiency.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that statistical 
sampling methodology can be quite complicated.129  It is not a stretch to say that a jury will be 
inclined to believe, perhaps without question, an expert’s declaration that a defendant is liable for 
a certain percentage of the total number of claims.  If the defendant calls an expert witness to 
dispute the plaintiff expert’s methodology, then the case will devolve into a mathematical dispute 
even where there is readily available evidence to assess each claim on its own merits.  This result 
is simply untenable where the plaintiff has not shown that statistical sampling is necessary. 
It has also been argued that statistical sampling is necessary as a deterrent to stop the 
widespread perpetuation of fraud and to ensure that the government receives a full recovery of 
the money it has lost through fraud.130  This is certainly true of cases where there are a large 
number of homogenous claims.131  It is far less certain in cases with a smaller number of discrete 
claims.  More importantly, this argument ignores the fact that the FCA contains both a treble 
damages provision as well as the potential for significant fines.132  This means that for every 
claim where liability is found the government is receiving essentially three claims worth of 
                                                        
127 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *59–60. 
128 Id. at *64. 
129 See United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55384, at *7 (explaining the 
complex methodology of statistical sampling through expert witness testimony). 
130 See Markey & Sarola, supra note 15. 
131 See Markey & Sarola, supra note 15 (arguing that statistical sampling is especially warranted in cases where 
there are a large number of claims). 
132  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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recovery, even without consideration of potential fines.  This greatly undermines any notion that 
statistical sampling is necessary as a deterrent or as a way of assuring full recovery.  On the 
contrary, it may be argued that the use of statistical sampling in conjunction with fines and treble 
damages is quite plainly punitive.133   
B. Determining Whether the Plaintiff Has Met the Burden of Establishing that Statistical  
     Sampling is Warranted  
With the need for a restrained approach to statistical sampling—and thus a presumption 
against its use—now established, it is now necessary to provide an analysis of the factors courts 
must consider in determining whether the plaintiff has successfully met its burden of showing 
that statistical sampling is warranted by the facts of the case.  The ensuing three-factor test is a 
synthesis of the various concerns and considerations framing the statistical sampling debate.  It is 
designed to provide a flexible framework that can be applied to the facts of any given case.  No 
factor in this test is solely determinative, and it is open to a not insignificant amount of 
interpretation.  This malleability is necessary, however, given the wide range of factual scenarios 
arising in health care fraud cases.  It should be noted that, before this three-factor test can be 
applied, the plaintiffs must prove liability in at least one instance.134  A bare statistical 
calculation applied to the entire universe of claims will not suffice without an underlying finding 
of liability based on some form of concrete evidence.135 
1. The Number of Claims 
There is an unavoidable connection between the number of claims in a case and the fact-
specificity of the claims at issue.  On one hand, a high number of claims undoubtedly warrant the 
                                                        
133 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77 (arguing that the government’s use of a “bloated damages provision which is 
the trebled” is primarily a way of strong-arming defendants into settlements). 
134 See United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853, 856. 
135 See supra notes 105–109 and accompanying text. 
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use of statistical sampling.136  On the other hand, a universe of highly discrete claims warrants 
claim-by-claim review.137  It seems clear, however, that where claim-by-claim review is 
completely untenable due to a large number of claims, statistical sampling is warranted.138  This 
is especially true considering the fact that “large-scale perpetrators of fraud would reap the 
benefits” of a system that did not allow statistical sampling in cases with a large number of 
claims, “because the government could not possibly pursue each individual claim.”139  Indeed, it 
may be said that Martin, in allowing extrapolation to the tens of thousands of total claims at 
issue,  “ensured perpetrators of fraud would not be able to escape liability because of the broad 
scope of their fraud.”140  On the other hand, Michaels, in not allowing a statistical model to 
extrapolate for thousands of claims at issue, may well have been wrongly decided.141 
The point at which the number of total claims makes claim-by-claim review untenable 
will be a function of the claims’ overall discreteness.  A high number of discrete, fact-specific 
claims will require a greater number of total claims before the court determines that claim-by-
claim review is unfeasible.  Conversely, the court can allow statistical sampling for a much lower 
number of claims where the claims at issue are largely homogenous.142  In this way, the first 
factor of the framework serves the double purpose of allowing statistical sampling where it is 
absolutely necessary or where the risks are relatively small, while also protecting against its use 
where the claims’ discreteness warrants a greater deference to claim-by-claim review. 
2. Whether the Level of Fact-Specificity and the Discreteness of the Individual Claims is   
                                                        
136 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
138 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *45 (arguing that 
statistical sampling is warranted where there is not a sufficiently limited universe of claims). 
139 Id. at *38. 
140 Recent Case: False Claims Act, supra note 69. 
141 See United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379, at *3 (“The total 
number of claims involved in the trial will be staggering.”). 
142 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
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     Such that Claim-by-Claim Review is Necessary 
This portion of the framework is designed to ensure that statistical sampling will rarely, if 
ever, be used where claim-by-claim review is feasible.  The only exception would be where the 
claims are so homogenous in nature that proof of liability in one claim necessarily means a proof 
of liability in all, or at least a substantial number, of claims.143  The principle behind this factor is 
simply that it runs counter to the basic and long-established principles of American jurisprudence 
to relieve the plaintiff from presenting specific evidence for each individual claim when such 
evidence is readily available.  Had statistical sampling been used in cases such as Michaels or El-
Amin, the court would have essentially been allowing an inference to take the place of readily 
available hard evidence.144  While there is an understandable need for expediency in litigation, 
the price of ignoring especially relevant evidence in the place of an inference hardly seems worth 
the risk.  In essence, the plaintiff will be unable to meet its burden of demonstrating that 
statistical sampling is warranted so long as the total number of claims is manageable in number 
and sufficiently discrete and heterogeneous in composition. 
It should also be made clear exactly what is meant by terms such as “fact-specificity” and 
“discreteness.”  In general, these terms apply to the level of homogeneity within a particular 
universe of claims.  For example, a defendant in a particular case may provide only one type of 
health care service and the claims at issue may apply to only one type of treatment or billing 
procedure.145  In such a case, there would be a high level of homogeneity in the total universe of 
claims because every claim at issue relates to roughly the same type of fraudulent activity 
                                                        
143 See United States v. Chen, No. 2:04-cv-00859, 2009 WL 1683142 (D. Nev. 2009) (allowing statistical sampling 
where defendant physician conceded that the services provided were the same for each claim at issue). 
144 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
145 See United States v. Chen, No. 2:04-cv-00859, 2009 WL 1683142 (jury found physician liable under the FCA for 
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 29 
conducted in roughly the same way.  The fact-specificity and discreteness of each individual 
claim would therefore be relatively small. 
By contrast, a particular universe of claims may be highly discrete where the defendant 
operates multiple businesses in multiple states and in varying forms of health care practice and 
treatment.146  In such an instance, a statistical model based on data from a specific institution in a 
specific state would have little relation to other claims stemming from other institutions in other 
states.  In such a case, the trial court would be forced to determine whether statistical sampling is 
feasible given the defendant’s complex administrative scheme.   
 
3. Other Mitigating Factors 
This third category is designed as a catchall category for any number of extenuating 
circumstances that may warrant the use of statistical sampling.  For instance, statistical sampling 
would be perfectly permissible where the defendant has consented to its use.147  Nor would 
statistical sampling be impermissible where a default judgment has been entered against the 
defendant.148  It would also be warranted where there has been bad faith on the part of the 
defendants, or where the destruction of evidence has left the plaintiff, through no fault of the 
plaintiff’s own, with no other feasible means of proving liability.149  It must be stated, however, 
that courts should use caution and restraint in deciding when novel circumstances call for the use 
of statistical sampling for proving liability. 
                                                        
146 See United States ex rel. Trim v. McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (noting that the defendant’s interstate 
business model greatly complicated the use of statistical sampling). 
147 See United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) supplemented, 909 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1995) aff'd 
in part and remanded, 111 F.3d 934, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (defendant physician consented to 
sampling).  
148 See United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242 (D.P.R. 2000) (basing damages calculation off of 
estimates overpayments after entry of a default judgment). 
149 See United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379, at *19–20 (inferring 
that use of statistical sampling would be proper where evidence has been destroyed). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 Statistical sampling has the potential to be an extremely powerful tool if permitted for use 
in proving liability in FCA cases.150  As such, its application warrants a great degree of 
thoughtfulness, lest its uninhibited use become a vehicle for abuse.  The fact that statistical 
sampling carries with it both great benefits and great drawbacks only creates further complexity.  
And with health care fraud cases increasing each year, the need for a resolution to the divided 
view on statistical sampling is not only necessary, but also pressing. 
 By creating a unified framework under which all statistical sampling cases can be 
analyzed, this comment hopes to bridge the divide between the courts by expounding a set of 
principles that allows for statistical sampling when the benefits are large and the risks are small, 
and which prohibits statistical sampling where the benefits are slight and the risks are pervasive.  
Ultimately, this framework seeks to ensure the dual purposes of not allowing “widespread fraud 
to go unpunished,”151 while also minimizing the risk that plaintiffs will be able to bypass 
traditional procedural safeguards where doing so would not be helpful or necessary.152  The 
result is a standard for analyzing statistical sampling that ensures fundamental fairness for the 
parties, predictable results, and a stable set of enduring principles against which future claims 





                                                        
150 Markey & Sarola, supra note 15. 
151 United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379, at *19. 
152 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 77 (implying that statistical sampling affords defendants insufficient process). 
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